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The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of negative feedback 
on self-reported religious identity among Christian students. After initially 
rating themselves on a computer-administered continuous scale ranging from 
as religious as possible to not at all religious, participants completed a 
difficult Bible trivia quiz and received negative feedback regarding their 
performance. The participants were then made to believe that their initial 
computer ratings had been lost, and were asked to rate themselves a second 
time. Individuals also completed the Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale 
and were divided into high and low religiosity groups. Statistical analyses 
revealed that participants were consistent in their pre- and post-ratings 
despite the negative feedback on the quiz; low and high religiosity groups 
were equally consistent. The results therefore suggest that self-reported 
religiosity is a resilient construct. Given the low level of statistical power of this 
study, however, more research is needed before more definitive conclusions 
can be drawn. 
The question is not whether people identify 
themselves as religious or not, but rather, if this self-
proclaimed title is fixed or flexible in the face of 
some negative event. It is all-to-common to hear 
stories of individuals who, in the face of difficulty, 
throw in the towel and turn away from the very 
beliefs once held so strongly. Within the Christian 
faith alone, arguably one of the most well-known 
examples follows Jesus' arrest, when the disciple 
Peter denied knowing Jesus three times (Luke 
22:54-62, New International Version). Moreover, 
later in the third century, early Christians faced 
persecution under the emperor Decius and 
thousands lapsed in their faith. Even today, it is 
common for individuals experiencing bereavement to 
re-evaluate, question, or doubt one's religious  
understanding or worldview (Tedeschi, 2006). 
Stories such as the young Cassie Bernal' (who, 
before being shot at Columbine in 1999, was asked 
if she believed in God, to which she is reported to 
have replied "yes"), while inspiring to some, are rare 
and shocking to others. 
Religiosity, here, is defined as how one perceives 
himself or herself as a religious person; including 
both activities associated with an organized religion 
or community, such as attending a religious service, 
and activities that are more subtle or personal, such 
as praying or committing random acts of 
benevolence in the name of faith, specifically 
focusing on Christianity. Is it true, then, that one's 
religiosity fluctuates in the face of challenges? If so, 
who is affected by this change, those with high or 
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low religiosity? This is an important question that 
has been overlooked in the prior literature. Previous 
literature has focused primarily on the influence of 
negative events on one's overall self-esteem, rather 
than applying it specifically to religiosity. For 
example, DeHart and Pelham (2007) looked at the 
effects of daily negative events on fluctuations in 
state implicit self-esteem. They found that 
individuals, who had low self-concepts, showed 
decreases in state implicit self-esteem following 
negative experiences, whereas individuals who had 
high self-concepts, maintained a stable implicit self-
esteem. 
A study by Kernis, Grannemann, and Barclay 
(1992) examined how the stability of self-esteem 
might factor in the process of excuse making 
following feedback on a test in a course. One 
hundred and thirty-eight undergraduate psychology 
students completed several self-esteem measures 
about two weeks into the semester, including 
Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale, the Rosenberg's 
Stability Scale, the overgeneralization subscale of the 
Attitudes Toward Self Scale, the Crowne-Marlowe 
Social Desirability Scale and the Self-Validation 
Scale. About one week later, the students stated the 
lowest grade they would be happy with on the first 
test and filled out the Need for Cognition Scale. 
Two weeks later, students received feedback of 
success (i.e, a score equal to or above the stated 
score) or failure (i.e, a score lower than the stated 
score) on the first test. Students were then given 
materials that included measures of excuse making 
behaviors. The results showed unstable high self-
esteemed participants were more likely to make 
excuses following success (positive feedback) but 
not failure (negative feedback), whereas unstable 
low self-esteemed participants were more likely to 
make excuses following a failure rather than a 
success. 
More recently, Abela and Taylor (2003) 
examined the moderating role of self-esteem on 
depressive mood reactions in schoolchildren. During 
the first assessment, third and seventh grade children 
filled out questionnaires regarding depressive mood, 
self-criticism, dependency and self-esteem. Six 
weeks later a second assessment took place, during 
which measures for depressive mood and negative  
events were administered. The results showed that 
high self-criticism and negative events lead to an 
increase in depressive moods for the children with 
low self-esteem, but not for those children with high 
self-esteem. Consequently, the researchers stated: 
"the results of this study suggest that high levels of 
self-esteem may buffer children with high levels of 
self-criticism against such reactions" as depressive 
moods (p. 416). In other words, children with high 
self-esteem were unaffected by self-criticism, but 
children with low self-esteem suffered the 
consequence of developing a depressive mood. 
When the literature discusses religiosity 
specifically, much of the attention is focused on 
whether maintaining spiritual beliefs is correlated to a 
higher level of emotional well-being or a better 
quality of life. Hodges (2002) makes the argument 
that an emotionally healthy adult is one who leads 
"an active spiritual life, who finds meaning and 
purpose in life and who operates from an intrinsic 
value system that guides [his or her] life's work and 
decisions" (p. 114). Intrinsic values involve an 
orientation toward religion that is neither self-serving, 
nor influenced by peer pressure, but stable across 
time and situations; forming the foundation on which 
meaning is found in life. This conclusion was met by 
looking at four major dimensions of spiritual well-
being that have been predominantly agreed upon in 
the literature; meaning in life, intrinsic values, 
transcendence, and community of shared values and 
community support. 
Elam (2001) used a battery of surveys, including 
the Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale and the 
SIU Religiosity Scale, to look at whether there was 
a relationship between spirituality and religiosity and 
positive and/or negative affect. The results showed 
spirituality to be positively correlated with positive 
affect and negatively correlated with depression and 
anxiety. Religiosity was further found to be a 
predictor of ones overall life satisfaction. It is 
interesting that there is a distinction made between 
spirituality and religiosity; both appear to be 
separate concepts that overlap. 
Keyes and Reitzes (2007) compared the 
religious identity of older working and retired adults 
to their mental health. They defined religious identity 
as "the self meanings attached to a religious role, 
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religious group, or the way that individuals perceive 
themselves as a religious person who holds religious 
or spiritual values or beliefs" (p. 435). The sample 
consisted of residents of a North Carolina 
metropolitan area, who were an average age of 65. 
Religious identity (personal attributes, such as 
competence, confidence, and sociability as a 
religious individual), religiosity (measured as a 
response ranging from deeply religious to not at all 
religious), along with other activities, such as 
attending religious services, reading the Bible and 
watching or listening to religious TV or radio 
programs were measured. The respondents' mental 
health was measured using Rosenberg's 10-item 
scale of overall self worth and the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). 
The findings indicated that one's religious identity 
was positively correlated to self-esteem and 
negatively to depressive symptoms; however, church 
attendance was not. 
Interestingly, however, Mullet, Barros, Frongia, 
Usai, and Shafighi (2003) found that individuals 
were more willing to forgive and less likely to exact 
revenge or hold a grudge based primarily on church 
attendance, or a social commitment, rather than a 
personal belief in God. In a second study, they 
included individuals with a greater social 
commitment to religion (i.e., priests, nuns) and found 
similar results. It appears that although a personal 
commitment is indicative of higher emotional well-
being and lower depressive symptoms, it is the 
social, rather than personal, aspect that determines 
one's likelihood to forgive others. 
Further research has found that higher levels of 
spirituality are indicative of improved psychological 
adjustment among cancer patients diagnosed within 
the previous five years, as seen in reduced stress 
and depression levels and increased quality of life 
(Laubmeier, Zakowski, & Bair, 2004). These results 
were consistent across all forms of cancer, 
regardless of how life threatening. 
More specific to the interest of the current 
research is whether one's religiosity, though it may 
consistently exude an array of positive benefits, 
changes. The literature seems to be in agreement 
that it is part of human nature to look for meaning in 
life, and in doing so, there are different stages that  
one's faith will progress through over one's lifespan; 
however, the process of moving between stages is 
somewhat debated. On one side, Fowler (1991) 
depicts seven distinct stages of faith development 
that an individual progresses through as he or she 
ages. Beginning with Primal Faith in infancy, an infant 
forms trust and mutuality with a caregiver before the 
development of language, which forms the 
foundation on which later faith develops. Once the 
child is older and in the third stage, Mythical-Literal, 
he or she begins to see faith as fulfilling mythical 
(emotional) needs, literal (cognitive) needs, both or 
neither, as critical thinking skills begin to develop. 
The process ends in adulthood with Universalizing 
Faith, where the individual's perspective is no longer 
centered on the self, but on God. 
From the other perspective, Clore and Fitzgerald 
(2002) agreed that there is a progression in faith 
development; however, they mention a more 
succinct four levels (Self-Moral, World Coherence, 
Symbolic Function, and Authority), rather than 
seven. Also, the method of progression differs 
according to Clore and Fitzgerald; they found that 
"rather than a sequential set of displacements, faith 
involves a progressive integration of new elements 
into an existing base" (p. 104). This process is less a 
result of one's development and more an intentional 
re-evaluation of one's faith. 
More closely related to the current research is a 
study by Shaffer and Hastings (2007). They looked 
at how Catholics high or low in authoritarianism 
responded to a threatening or non-threatening essay 
about Catholicism with regards to a measure of 
religious fundamentalism, amount of doubts 
conveyed, and identification with their religious 
affiliation. They found that those who read the 
threatening essay conveyed fewer doubts, identified 
more with their religious affiliation, and supported 
religious fundamentalism more than those who read 
the neutral essay, especially if they also possessed an 
authoritarian personality. 
The purpose of this study is rooted in past 
research, but the specific issue has not been dealt 
with directly. This study will examine the effect of 
receiving negative feedback on individuals who 
identify themselves as being "high" or "low" on 
religiosity. As stated above, religiosity is defined here 
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as how one perceives himself or herself as a religious 
person; including both activities associated with an 
organized religion or community, such as attending a 
religious service, and activities that are more subtle 
or personal, such as praying or committing random 
acts of benevolence in the name of faith, specifically 
focusing on Christianity. For the purpose of the 
current study religiosity will be used interchangeably 
with religious identity. Negative feedback is defined 
as informing individuals of their lack of knowledge, 
regarding the beliefs of their faith, after completion of 
a difficult Bible quiz. The goal is to investigate if 
one's religiosity can be affected in the short term, 
after learning that one's performance is sub-par 
compared to one's religious peers. Therefore, the 
research questions here are: a) Will participants re-
evaluate the level of their religious identity based on 
evidence that contradicts what was originally 
believed, or will they hold to their original 
convictions?, and b) If negative feedback does result 
in a re-evaluation, will there be a difference in how 
those originally high or low in religiosity change their 
perspectives? 
The first research question is specifically 
consistent with Clore and Fitzgerald's (2002) 
research that individuals intently re-evaluate and 
incorporate new pieces of information into their 
religious identity. The second question deals more 
broadly with research by Shaffer and Hastings 
(2007); however, here the idea is that reasonable 
and personal feedback is given that, although 
negative, is not presented as threatening. Also, 
Laubmeier et al. (2004) deal with this question to 
some degree, except that, although they find 
religiosity to be a flexible trait, their participants are 
also dealing with a threatening situation, namely 
cancer. 
The anticipated outcomes are not entirely in 
accordance with the results of the literature reviewed 
above. Typically, an individual with high self-esteem 
maintains a stable self-esteem or experiences less 
distress when faced with a negative event, whereas 
an individual with low self-esteem is more likely to 
experience a further drop in self-esteem or greater 
distress as a consequence. Likewise, when 
individuals are threatened, either with an illness or 
about their beliefs, they tend to hold more firmly to 
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their beliefs and exhibit fewer doubts. However, it is 
hypothesized that participants high on religiosity will 
have a strong and personal tie to their religious 
identity that they consider highly important 
(Princeton Religious Research Center, 1996). 
Consequently, reasonable negative feedback 
regarding one's religiosity would be interpreted as 
more distressing to those participants who hold 
strong ties to their religious identity than to those 
participants who are low on religiosity. This is 
specifically because the participants should not feel 
threatened and can therefore make a conscious and 
honest effort to consider the validity and 
consequences of the feedback. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that high religiosity participants should 
lower their personal ratings of their religious identity 
significantly more than low religiosity participants 
after receiving negative feedback. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in this study received course credit 
as compensation for participation. A total of 24 
participants, who identified themselves as Christians, 
were recruited. There were no restrictions on 
specific denominations. The mean age of the 
participants was 19.75 years, and 62.5% (n = 15) 
were female. The majority were Caucasian (79.2%), 
followed by African American (8.3%), Hispanic 
(4.2%), Native American (4.2%) and Other (4.2%). 
Materials 
The Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale 
(SIBS) was administered to each participant to 
determine religiosity and divide them into the high 
and low religiosity groups. This scale is designed to 
measure actions as well as beliefs, in order to 
achieve a complete measure of religiosity. It consists 
of 26 items, scored on a Likert-type scale. It 
consists of four main domains (internal beliefs, 
external practices, personal application, and 
existential and meditative beliefs) with wording that 
is general enough to be used within the framework 
of most faiths. The SIBS scale has been shown to 
yield scores that are reliable and valid. Internal 
consistency has yielded a Cronbach's alpha of 0.92, 
test-retest reliability of 0.92, and the convergent 
construct validity of 0.80 (Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus, 
& Hellmich, 1998; Mystakidou, Tsilika, Parpa, 
Smyrnioti, & Vlahos, 2007). The top 50% of the 
scores made up the high religiosity group and the 
bottom 50% of the scores made up the low 
religiosity group. 
Idiogrid (Grice, 2002) was also used to 
administer a personal rating of the participant's 
religiosity. Idiogrid is software designed to allow the 
researcher to create and analyze repertory grids 
using a Dynamic Analog Scale (DAS) (Grice & 
Mignogna, 2008). The participant was prompted to 
enter the names of five people who fit particular role 
titles (viz., mother figure, father figure, a close friend, 
a romantic partner, and a person whom he or she 
dislikes). Next the participant selected and placed 
each name, along with Your Self on an analog scale 
ranging from as religious as possible to not at all 
religious to create a comparative rating of his or her 
self. The possible scale range was from -200 to 
+200. A religious person was defined as: 
Someone who has or shows a belief in or 
reverence for God. This can be exhibited by 
taking part in activities, such as attending 
religious services, taking part in Eucharist, 
reading or studying the Bible, or committing 
random acts of kindness. This belief can also be 
exhibited in a more subtle manner, such as 
praying, forgiving others, show a high level of 
ethical responsibility, or using faith in daily life. 
A basic knowledge quiz was also administered to 
each participant, which consisted of 20 questions 
randomly selected from Bob Phillips' Hard Trivia 
section from The Awesome Book of Bible Trivia 
(2004). It was therefore expected that all 
participants would perform very poorly on the quiz. 
The quiz contained questions such as naming the 
twelve apostles. Lastly, a 100-item Big-Five 
personality questionnaire (Goldberg, 1999) was 
administered as a distracter task and was not used in 
any of the analyses. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a private 
room with four computer work stations divided by 
privacy panels. They were told that they would be  
participating in a study titled "Religiosity and 
Personality" in order to protect the nature of the 
study. Participants were first asked to complete a 
demographics sheet and the Spiritual Involvement 
and Beliefs Scale. Next participants were asked to 
turn on the computer monitor, where Idiogrid was 
already setup. Each participant completed the first 
DAS by providing five names (mother figure, father 
figure, a close friend, a romantic partner and a 
person whom he or she dislikes) and then 
comparatively rating himself or herself on a 
continuous scale ranging from as religious as 
possible to not at all religious. Upon completion, 
participants were moved to an adjacent computer 
station, separated by a privacy panel. The 
experimenter handed the participant the Bible quiz to 
complete. If participants asked what to do on 
unknown questions, they were told they could either 
guess or leave it blank. As much time was provided 
as the participants needed (typically no more than 7-
10 minutes). 
While the participant worked on the quiz, the 
experimenter saved the DAS ratings; however, the 
experimenter also began a ruse. Specifically, while 
saving the DAS ratings, the experimenter exclaimed 
"Oh shoot!" and then remained silent while pressing 
several random keys on the keyboard to mimic 
computer activity. Once the participant completed 
the quiz, any comments about his or her 
performance were politely deflected by asking the 
participant to turn on the computer monitor 
(participants were still adjacent to the work station 
where the first DAS ratings were completed). They 
were then asked to complete the personality 
inventory (already set up on the computer). 
The experimenter then graded the Bible quiz, 
marking wrong answers with a red marker and 
writing the number correct (i.e., 2/20) at the top and 
circling it. Once the participant finished with the 
personality inventory, he or she received negative 
feedback using the following script: 
Thanks! Normally, this is the end of the study, 
but... I hate to ask this... could you please 
complete the computer ratings again? Dr. X 
[professor's name] is going to kill me... but I 
accidentally deleted your first ratings. It will 
only take a few minutes. 
64 
All participants agreed to complete the ratings again, 
and the following statements were made: 
Great! Thanks, I really appreciate it. While I set 
up the file, you can look over your Bible quiz. 
I'm afraid, as you might have guessed, you 
didn't do very well. You only got (#) of the 
items right. We've found that most Christians 
actually tend to get at least 12 of the 20 items 
right. 
Any questions or comments made by the participant 
were politely deflected, and the experimenter 
continued setting up the file (15-20 seconds). The 
participants then completed the DAS for the second 
time on the computer. This minor deception was 
necessary to reduce the demand characteristics of 
the experiment; namely that the change in rating was 
what was of interest. Specifically, making the 
participants believe that the previous rating was lost 
should have allowed them to feel comfortable 
changing their rating upon receiving negative 
feedback without feeling restricted by their initial 
rating. IRB approval for this deception was both 
sought and attained prior to any participants' taking 
part in the study. 
Lastly, all participants were debriefed regarding 
the purpose and nature of the study, specifically 
discussing the necessity of the deception used. A 
written debriefing statement was read with them and 
any questions were answered. Given that the mild 
deception needed to be protected from future 
participants, the participants did not receive a copy 
of the debriefing statement. 
Results 
The difference between the participants' DAS 
rating of the self at Time 1 and Time 2 was analyzed 
with a matched-pairs t test. Time 2 (M= 109.92, 
SD = 56.02) ratings did decrease slightly from Time 
1 (M= 122.08, SD = 44.93), but this difference 
was not statistically significant, t(23) = 1.79, 
p= .086, two-tailed. Although the mean difference. 
was small (Mdiff = 12.17, SDdiff = 33.25, d = .24), 
the effect was in the predicted direction, indicating 
that overall participants decreased their religiosity 
rating by an average of roughly 12 points (on a -200 
to 200 point scale) after receiving negative feedback 
on quiz performance. The 95% confidence interval 
was fairly narrow (-1.87 to 26.21) on the 400 point 
scale. 
There was one outlier, with a decrease from Time 
1 to Time 2 of 109 points. Removing this extreme 
score, the data were analyzed again with another 
matched pairs t test. Time 2 (M= 114.70, 
SD = 52.04) still decreased slightly from Time 1 
(M= 122.65, SD = 45.85), but this difference also 
was not statistically significant, t(22) =1.43, 
p= .166, two-tailed. The mean difference was even 
smaller (Mdiff = 7.96, SDdiff = 26.66, d = .16), but 
the 95% confidence interval was narrower (-3.57 to 
19.49) on the scale. 
An independent samples t test was performed 
comparing the mean Selfdiff scores (Time 1— Time 2) 
of the top and bottom 50% of the SIBS scores. No 
significant difference between high (M= 8.00, 
SD = 39.06, n= 12) and low (M= 16.33, 
SD = 27.34, n= 12) religiosity was found, 
t(22) = -.605, p = .551, two-tailed. The mean 
difference of -8.33 scale units indicated a small 
effect (400 point scale range, d = .25), and the 95% 
confidence interval around the difference between 
group means was wide (-36.88 to 20.21). The 
outlier was included in the high religiosity group, and, 
therefore, accounts for a more extreme decrease in 
ratings and a higher standard deviation. 
In order to make the difference between high and 
low religiosity more extreme (as well as to exclude 
the outlier), the top and bottom third of the SIBS 
scores were compared on their mean Selfdiff scores 
with another independent samples t test. Still, no 
significant difference between high (M= -5.63, 
SD = 25.46, n = 8) and low (M= 17.63, 
SD = 25.55, n= 8) religiosity was found, 
t(14) = -1.823,p = .090, two-tailed. The mean 
difference of -23.25 scale units, however, was large 
(400 point scale range, d = .91), and the 95% 
confidence interval was again wide (-50.60 to 4.10). 
Although not significant, the direction of the effect 
was, interestingly, opposite of what was expected; 
low religiosity individuals decreased their DAS 
ratings more so than high religiosity individuals. 
Further, a number of exploratory analyses were 
conducted. A Pearson's r was conducted to 
compare DAS ratings at Time 1, Time 2, and Selfdiff  
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(Time 1— Time 2) to SIBS scores. Time 2 
compared with SIBS was mildly significant at the 
.05 level (r = .424), whereas Time 1 and Selfdiff  
compared to SIBS were not significant (r = .398 
and -.177, respectively). This shows that 
participants' scores on the SIBS were similar to their 
DAS religiosity ratings at Time 2 (i.e., higher SIBS 
scores were correlated with higher ratings of 
religiosity at Time 2). However, the relationship 
between participants' scores on the SIBS and 
religiosity ratings at Time 1 was weak. Also, no 
relationship was found between SIBS scores and 
the difference in religiosity ratings. 
A bivariate correlation was computed on each of 
the rated persons (self, mother figure, father figure, 
etc.) at Time 1 and Time 2 to evaluate the 
consistency of the religiosity rating. Participants 
tended to rate each person similar during the post-
test (Time 2) to how they were rated during the pre-
test (Time 1). All results yielded highly significant 
(p < .01) positive correlations, the lowest being for 
the participants' ratings of themselves (r = .805). 
Further, each rated person was compared to 
itself at Time 1 and Time 2 again using a matched-
pairs t test to investigate any changes. None of the 
results yielded were significant; however, the data on 
the mother figure (Mdiff = 10.33, SDdiff = 34.99) 
were quite similar to that of the self All other 
elements (Dad, Friend, Romantic Partner, and 
Dislike) stayed constant from Time 1 to Time 2, with 
the largest mean difference being the disliked person 
(Mdiff = -4.43). 
Bivariate correlations comparing participants' 
responses to each question on the SIBS to Selfdiff  
ratings were computed. Only two significant 
comparisons resulted from these analyses at the .05 
level: Selfdiff was negatively correlated with the 
questions "I am thankful for all that has happened to 
me" and "When I am ashamed of something I have 
done, I tell," r = -.446 and -.412, respectively. 
An independent samples t test was performed 
comparing the mean Selfdiff scores of males and 
females. There was no significant difference between 
males (M = 15.33, SD = 25.23, n = 9) and females 
(M= 10.27, SD = 37.97, n = 15), t(22) = -.354, 
p = .726, two-tailed. The mean difference of -5.07 
scale units indicated a small effect (400 point scale 
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range, d= .15), and the 95% confidence interval 
around the difference between group means was 
fairly wide (-34.71 to 24.58). As for the other 
demographics, a one-way ANOVA did not reveal 
any differences in ethnicity or age on the Selfdiff  
scores, (p = .742 and .879, respectively). 
Discussion 
Although the hypothesis of this study was not 
supported, it, nonetheless, yielded some interesting 
findings. The significant positive correlation of each 
individual person at Time 1 and Time 2 showed that 
participants did view their religiosity, and the 
religiosity of the other persons, in generally the same 
direction at Time 2 as they did at Time 1 (i.e., a 
person who rated himself as highly religious at Time 
1 typically still saw himself higher on the scale at 
Time 2). This was consistent with the hypothesis; it 
was not expected that participants would rate 
themselves as "not religious," only that they would 
re-evaluate the magnitude. 
However, in comparing the mean difference of 
the Dynamic Analog self ratings from Time 1 to Time 
2, the re-evaluation was not significant, and so it 
cannot be said with any confidence that the overall 
slight decrease in rating was anything more than 
chance. Also, as mentioned above, there was an 
outlier who decreased 109 scale units at Time 2 (half 
of the scale). After conducting another analysis on 
the data excluding the outlier, the results still were 
not significant. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that 
there was an influential case causing the overall mean 
at Time 2 to drop inordinately. The overall trend of 
the data to decrease at Time 2 remained the same to 
a lesser degree with the second analysis. 
When the sample was divided in half based on 
SIBS scores, to create the high and low religiosity 
groups, the findings, although not significant, were 
opposite of what was anticipated. The high 
religiosity group had a mean decrease of 8.00 scale 
units lower at Time 2, whereas the low religiosity 
group had a mean decrease of 16.33 scale units. To 
investigate this further, the sample was divided into 
three groups, low, medium, and high, in order to 
create a more extreme difference between high and 
low. These results, although not significant, were 
opposite of the hypothesis as well. The high 
religiosity group had a mean difference of 5.63 scale 
units higher at Time 2, and the low religiosity group 
had a mean difference of 17.63 scale units lower. 
It was intriguing that in the more extreme high 
religiosity group the scores actually went up at Time 
2. As a possible explanation for this behavior, those 
who are more religious may be more in tune with 
actions or behaviors that are characteristic of being 
religious. If this is true, by redoing the DAS ratings 
that the experimenter "lost," they were displaying 
their good character, which is a result of being a 
religious person. After receiving the bad news that 
they performed sub-par on the quiz, they may have 
overcompensated with this helpful act and rated 
themselves higher. It should be noted that the range 
of the SIBS scores used in developing the high and 
low religiosity groups was quite restricted overall 
(see Table 1). All scores were relatively high, 
presumably because all participants identified 
themselves as Christian, and consequently both the 
high and low religiosity groups were relatively high. 
It would be beneficial in the future to obtain scores 
across the whole range, perhaps by including 
individuals of other religions or individuals who do 
not hold strong religious convictions. 
Another potential issue to be addressed with this 
study is construct validity. From the insignificant 
correlation of Time 1 to SIBS scores, it can be 
assumed that the individuals made some type of 
differentiation between religious and spiritual. 
(Correlations of SIBS scores with DAS ratings at 
Time 1 and Time 2 were both low to moderate, 
r = .398 and .424, respectively, thus showing that 
they — SIBS scores and DAS ratings — are largely 
different.) The DAS ratings used the term religious 
and not spiritual, whereas the SIBS used only 
spiritual and does not mention religious. Given that 
the two concepts of spirituality and religiosity were 
merged in this study, the best solution would be to 
reword the DAS definition of what a religious 
person is to include both religious and spiritual 
aspects. 
Dealing further with the construct validity, it is 
possible that there was no significant re-evaluation of 
religiosity from Time 1 to Time 2 because the 
feedback was unimportant to the participants. It is  
likely that Bible knowledge competence is only one 
small portion of what it means as a whole to be 
religious. Therefore, it could be advantageous in 
ensuring the study is tapping in on the desired 
religiosity construct, if more complete backgrounds 
of the participants were collected, specifically on 
what aspects of being religious they value. For 
example, an individual who finds it highly important 
to thoroughly know the Bible might respond in line 
with the hypothesis, compared to someone who puts 
more weight on leading a moral life. 
A further aspect of the data that was fascinating 
was the analysis of each of the other rated people at 
Time 1 and Time 2. The mean difference of all of the 
elements was essentially nil (less than 4.50 scale 
units), except for Mom (10.33 scale units), whose 
mean difference most closely resembled that of the 
self (12.17 scale units). This could be explained in 
that the majority (62.5%) of the sample was female. 
Girls tend to identify themselves more with their 
mother figure, and, as a result, a decrease in the Self 
could be transferred to whom they feel the most 
similar to, causing a similar change in the Mom 
rating. 
Lastly, each individual question on the SIBS was 
correlated to the mean difference of the DAS self 
rating. Two of the 26 questions resulted in significant 
negative correlations, "I am thankful for all that has 
happened to me" and "When I am ashamed of 
something I have done, I tell." In understanding the 
former correlation, perhaps individuals were thankful 
to know an apparent weakness of theirs and 
maintained the original ratings with the intent to 
improve. Conversely, individuals who were not 
thankful for everything may have been unhappy with 
the feedback and changed their rating due to 
cognitive dissonance. With respect to the latter 
question, assuming the feedback made participants 
at least mildly ashamed, individuals who tell when 
they are ashamed could have maintained their overall 
rating of religiosity, knowing and accepting they have 
their faults. On the other hand, perhaps individuals 
who tend to remain silent when they are ashamed 
changed their ratings as a defense, saying that they 
have nothing to be ashamed of. On a different note, 
it is strange that the question "I probably will not 
reexamine my spiritual beliefs" was not correlated to 
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whether individuals changed their ratings; one would 
expect the two to be somewhat correlated. 
In conclusion, the overall results of this study 
seem to show religiosity as a fixed construct, a 
finding inconsistent both with this study's hypothesis 
as well as research by Laubmeier et al. (2004), who 
found one's religiosity after a diagnosis of cancer to 
be flexible. The findings here are, however, 
consistent with Shaffer and Hastings' (2007) 
findings, who found that people, especially those 
with an authoritarian personality, hold more firmly to 
their religious identity and possess fewer doubts 
when faced with threats. Also, this finding supports 
previous research on self-esteem, namely that 
individuals with high self-esteem are less affected by 
negative events than those with low self-esteem 
(Kernis et al. 1992; Abela & Taylor, 2003; DeHart 
& Pelham, 2007). 
There are several aspects of this study that could 
be improved in the future. Foremost, this study had 
a low level of power, and thus the likelihood of 
making a Type II error was increased. The 
population effect, if in fact there is one, is likely small 
or medium, and so a larger sample size is warranted 
in future studies in order to uncover any findings. 
Also, with a restricted range of the SIBS data, only 
the top portion of the spectrum was represented. 
Any restricted range comes with the risk of 
attenuated results, further increasing the possibility of 
a Type II error. Future studies could replicate the 
present one with a representation of the whole 
range, by perhaps adding other religions in the 
analysis. 
Lastly, there are many avenues of research 
expanded from the present study that could foster a 
better understanding of one's religious identity in the 
future. For example: a) the sample could be 
expanded to include clergy as well as lay persons of 
a variety of faiths (other than only Christianity), b) 
more figures could be added in the DAS ratings, 
giving the participant more of an elaborate basis of 
comparison (i.e., Jesus, the Pope, Billy Graham, 
Satan, the Ideal Self, or the typical Christian), c) the 
quiz could be made verbal, as opposed to written, 
d) positive feedback could be given, as opposed to 
negative, e) a broader scope of religious values 
could be used, besides only knowledge of the Bible,  
or f) individuals with more intrinsic versus extrinsic 
religious views could be compared. It is apparent 
that there is still much room for research in this area. 
Only after a more thorough basis of research is 
obtained can more definitive conclusions of one's 
religious identity be drawn. 
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Table 1 
Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale Scores 
Participant 	 Score 	 Participant 	 Score 
1 
	
100 	 13 	 108 
2 
	 98 	 14 	 110 
3 
	
74 	 15 	 106 
4 
	
102 	 16 	 81 
5 
	
111 	 17 	 110 
6 
	
89 	 18 	 105 
7 
	
96 	 19 	 99 
8 
	
92 	 20 	 117 
9 
	
100 	 21 	 117 
10 
	
103 	 22 	 98 
11 
	
102 	 23 	 91 
12 
	
85 	 24 	 99 
Note. Observed scale range was 74 to 117 on a possible scale range of26 to 130 
